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ARTICLE I, SECTION 11: A POOR “PLAN B” FOR 
WASHINGTON’S RELIGIOUS PHARMACISTS 
Noel E. Horton∗ 
Abstract: In Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky,1 a group of Washington pharmacists contended 
their religious beliefs precluded them from dispensing the drug Plan B, a post-coital 
emergency contraceptive. They based their argument on rights conferred by the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 A United States 
District Court found in the pharmacists’ favor and enjoined enforcement of rules issued by 
the Washington State Board of Pharmacy requiring pharmacies to deliver medications.3 The 
Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court erroneously applied a heightened level 
of scrutiny to a neutral law of general applicability.4 Interestingly, the pharmacists did not 
bring a claim under the Washington State Constitution, a document that has been interpreted 
to confer greater protection for free exercise rights than the U.S. Constitution.5 This 
Comment argues that even under the Washington State Constitution’s heightened protection 
of free exercise, the pharmacists’ position in Stormans would ultimately fail. The Board’s 
rules protect public health and accommodate individual religious objections, thereby 
satisfying the Washington State Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny test. 
INTRODUCTION 
Pharmacists play a critical role in our society. Our nation is one where 
medications have become intertwined with many people’s daily lives.6 
When abused or misused, many of these prescription medications can 
create serious health problems.7 To manage potential deleterious effects, 
                                                     
∗ Noel E. Horton is a J.D. candidate at the University of Washington School of Law and a Captain 
in the United States Air Force. The views expressed in this Comment are those of the author and do 
not reflect an official position of the Department of the Air Force, Department of Defense, or any 
other U.S. government agency.  
1. 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1117, 1119. 
3. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
4. Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1113, 1142. 
5. See infra Part III. 
6. According to a report released by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, from 
2003 through 2006, 46.9% of the population used at least one prescription medication over the 
course of a month. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2009: 
WITH SPECIAL FEATURE ON MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 350 (Jan. 2010), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus09.pdf. 
7. See Emma Ashburn, Dramatic Rise in Painkiller Drug Abuse: U.S. Officials, REUTERS (Jul. 
15, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66E66W20100715 (referencing a 400% 
increase over the past ten years in the number of Americans treated for prescription drug abuse). 
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states license professional pharmacists to handle and dispense 
medications.8 Consequently, pharmacists have become society’s 
gatekeepers to medicines that individuals can legally obtain from no 
other source. Many of these medications are controversial.9 Because 
pharmacists are human beings with their own moral and religious 
convictions, the prospect of providing certain controversial medications 
may seem morally reprehensible to some of them. Some pharmacists 
have been placed in a position where their religious beliefs prohibit 
dispensing the very medications with which they have been entrusted.10 
The health consequences of such a scenario are especially serious when 
dealing with time-sensitive medications or patients with limited access 
to health care facilities. 
The Washington State Board of Pharmacy found this state of affairs 
to be disconcerting; in 2006, it began drafting new regulations to address 
the issue.11 The Board solicited numerous comments from pharmacists 
and advocacy groups.12 Most of these comments concerned the 
controversial drug Plan B,13 a post-coital emergency contraceptive.14 In 
the end, the Board adopted two new regulations: (1) an amendment to an 
                                                     
8. See Steven W. Huang, The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990: Redefining Pharmacists’ 
Legal Responsibilities, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 417, 428–29 (1998) (“customer[s] rel[y] on the 
pharmacist because the pharmacist ‘holds himself out as one having the peculiar learning and skill, 
and license from the state, to fill prescriptions.’ This trust places not only the customer’s health, but, 
at times, also his or her life in the hands of a pharmacist[]  . . . .”) (quoting Burke v. Bean, 363 
S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962)); Sarah J. Vokes, Just Fill the Prescription: Why Illinois’ 
Emergency Rule Appropriately Resolves the Tension Between Religion and Contraception in the 
Pharmacy Context, 24 LAW & INEQ. 399, 411–12 (2006). 
9. For a perspective on the controversy behind emergency contraception specifically, see Claire 
A. Smearman, Drawing the Line: The Legal, Ethical and Public Policy Implications of Refusal 
Clauses for Pharmacists, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 469, 490–91 (2006). 
10. See, e.g., Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[a]ppellees assert 
that their personal religious views do not permit them to dispense Plan B”). 
11. Brief for the Appellants at 10–11, Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(No. 07-36039, 07-36040) (describing the progression of the rulemaking process initiated by the 
Washington State Board of Pharmacy). 
12. Id. at 11–12. 
13. Id. 
14. Plan B is composed of the drug levonorgestrel. The drug reduces the chance of pregnancy 
after unprotected sex or contraceptive failure. As of July 2009, Plan B was approved by the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) for over the counter use by women aged 17 years and older. 
Women younger than 17 may obtain the drug by prescription. Letter from Scott Monroe and Andrea 
Leonard-Segal, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, to Michele G. Walsh, Clinical Regulatory 
Affairs (July 10, 2009) (on file with author), available at http://www.accessdata.fda. 
gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/ 2009/021998s000ltr.pdf.  
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existing regulation governing individual pharmacists,15 and (2) a new 
regulation governing pharmacies.16 The new rules allow individual 
pharmacists to refuse to distribute medications for religious reasons, but 
make the pharmacy responsible for ensuring that the drugs are 
nonetheless dispensed.17 
The day before the rules took effect, a group of Washington 
pharmacists challenged the rules under the Free Exercise Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment.18 The United States District Court 
for the Western District of Washington accepted their argument and 
enjoined enforcement of the rules in Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky.19 On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that 
because the regulations were neutral and generally applied, the district 
court erroneously applied heightened scrutiny.20 
The pharmacists in Stormans rested their free exercise argument 
solely on the First Amendment.21 But what if they had based their 
argument on the Washington State Constitution? In the wake of the 
Board’s recently announced decision to undertake a new rulemaking 
process,22 the answer to this question is especially relevant. Washington 
courts have interpreted the Free Exercise Clause of the Washington State 
Constitution23 to be more protective of free exercise rights than the First 
Amendment.24 Under Washington’s free exercise clause, article I, 
section 11 of the Washington State Constitution, the State must show 
that any action burdening free exercise—even those that are neutral and 
generally applied—serve a compelling interest and employ the least 
restrictive means to achieve that interest.25 This Comment argues that an 
                                                     
15. 07-14 Wash. Reg. 25 (July 26, 2007) (codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-863-095 
(2007)). 
16. Id. (codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-010 (2007)). 
17. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2009) (summarizing pharmacy 
and pharmacist responsibilities under the new rules). 
18. Id. at 1116–17, 1119; Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1253 (W.D. Wash. 
2007). 
19. Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1249, 1266. 
20. Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1113. 
21. Complaint at 16–17, Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2007) 
(No. C07-5374RBL). 
22. Jordan Schrader, A Reversal on Plan B: “Morning After” Pill: Rule Would Let Pharmacists 
Refuse to Dispense Drug, THE OLYMPIAN, July 14, 2010, at A1. 
23. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
24. See infra Part III. 
25. First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d. 203, 226–27, 840 P.2d 174, 187 
(1992). 
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article I, section 11 challenge by the pharmacists would ultimately fail. 
The interests served by the rules are sufficiently compelling, and the 
rules are narrowly tailored to achieve those interests. 
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of free exercise law 
under the First Amendment. Part II shows how the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Stormans is consistent with established First Amendment 
case law. Part III describes how the Washington State Supreme Court 
has interpreted article I, section 11 to be more protective than the First 
Amendment with respect to free exercise rights. Part IV depicts how 
Washington courts have consistently held that article I, section 11, even 
with its greater protection, generally does not shield citizens from state 
actions that promote public health, peace, and safety interests, such as 
laws promoting medical care. Finally, Part V argues that the pharmacy 
rules serve compelling public health interests and would thus be upheld 
in the face of an article I, section 11 challenge. 
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE 
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF NEUTRAL AND GENERALLY 
APPLIED LAWS INHIBITING FREE EXERCISE 
Under modern First Amendment jurisprudence, neutral and generally 
applicable laws burdening free exercise need only satisfy rational basis 
scrutiny.26 This level of scrutiny requires the State to show merely that 
the law is a rational means to achieve a legitimate end.27 To defeat a law 
under this standard, “[t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative 
arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support 
it . . . .”28 
The First Amendment provides, in relevant part: “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof . . . .”29 This provision embodies two distinct 
protections known conventionally as the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses. Although these rights originally constrained only the 
federal government, they have been made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.30 Each of the religious protections 
                                                     
26. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 885 (1990); see 
also infra note 41. 
27. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955). 
28. Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto 
Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). 
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
30. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (Establishment Clause); Cantwell v. 
Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause). 
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guaranteed by the First Amendment has spawned its own intricate set of 
case law. Cases involving government interference with personal 
religious behavior or conduct typically implicate the Free Exercise 
Clause rather than the Establishment Clause.31 
For example, in Sherbert v. Verner,32 the Supreme Court held that the 
Free Exercise Clause requires application of the strict scrutiny test.33 The 
Court determined that a Seventh Day Adventist could not be denied 
unemployment compensation because she refused to take a job that 
required her to work on her Sabbath.34 Under strict scrutiny, a court must 
invalidate any government action that burdens the free exercise of 
religion unless such action serves a compelling state interest and uses the 
least restrictive means to achieve that interest.35 
The Supreme Court modified the Sherbert test twenty-seven years 
later when it decided Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith.36 In that case, the Court upheld the denial 
of unemployment benefits to Native Americans who used peyote as part 
of their religious beliefs in violation of state law.37 Justice Scalia, 
speaking for the majority, distinguished between laws whose purpose is 
to curtail free exercise of religion and those that are neutral and 
generally applied but have an incidental effect on religion.38 The Smith 
majority reasoned that the First Amendment does not protect offenses 
against the latter type of law, noting that the Court had “never held that 
an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an 
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to 
regulate.”39 Thus, a state may, without offending the First Amendment, 
                                                     
31. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 3d Ed., § 12.3, 
1247 (2006); see also 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 443 (2010). 
32. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
33. Id. at 403. 
34. Id. at 399–402. 
35. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). 
36. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
37. Id. at 874, 890. 
38. Id. at 878. 
39. Id. at 878–88. Justice Scalia’s assertion, however, is not as straightforward as it might appear. 
In Sherbert, the Court struck down an unemployment compensation scheme because it conflicted 
with an individual’s religious beliefs. 374 U.S. at 403–09. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held that 
the State could not enforce a law requiring children under 16 years old to attend public school 
against Amish children as it would unduly interfere with free exercise rights under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 406 U.S. 205, 234–36 (1972). Justice Scalia distinguished these cases by 
noting that Sherbert “merely stand[s] for the proposition that where the State has in place a system 
of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ 
without compelling reason,” Smith, 494 U.S. at 884, and that Yoder “involved not the Free Exercise 
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enact a law that burdens free exercise of religion provided that the law is 
neutral and generally applicable.40 Laws fitting into this category need 
only survive rational basis scrutiny.41 
Although the Court in Smith discussed at length its reasons for 
exempting neutral and generally applied laws from strict scrutiny in free 
exercise cases, it did not elaborate on the meaning of the terms “neutral” 
and “generally applicable.”42 The Court provided additional insight on 
this point in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.43 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, acknowledged that 
“[n]eutrality and general applicability are interrelated,” and “failure to 
satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been 
satisfied.”44 Justice Kennedy then noted that each term had a distinct 
meaning in the free exercise context. Neutrality concerns whether “the 
object or purpose of the law is the suppression of religion or religious 
conduct.”45 At a minimum, the law must be “facial[ly] neutral[]”46 
toward religion, meaning that the law’s text must not “refer[] to a 
religious practice without a secular meaning.”47 Additionally, even a law 
not couched in religious terms may be non-neutral if it “targets religious 
conduct for distinctive treatment.”48 In contrast, Justice Kennedy 
explained that general applicability relates to whether the law 
“selective[ly] . . . impose[s] burdens only on conduct motivated by 
                                                     
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections.” Id. 
at 881. Some commentators have criticized Justice Scalia’s assertions on both fronts. See, e.g., Alan 
Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and Formal 
Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 191–92 (2002); Cedric Merlin Powell, The Scope of National Power 
and the Centrality of Religion, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 643, 669–71 (2000); Michael W. McConnell, Free 
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121–24 (1990). 
40. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, 884–85. 
41. Although Justice Scalia did not explicitly state that neutral and generally applicable laws 
burdening free exercise must be analyzed under rational basis scrutiny, lower courts have 
consistently interpreted Smith as so holding. See, e.g., Grace United Methodist Church v. City of 
Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 649 (10th Cir. 2006); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d. 1202, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 
1999); Brunson v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 710, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Horen 
v. Commonwealth, 479 S.E.2d 553, 557 (Va. Ct. App. 1997). 
42. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879–81, 886 n.3 (discussing “neutral” and “generally applicable” laws 
without explicitly defining either term).  
43. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  
44. Id. at 531. Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion stated that in his view the two terms—
“neutrality” and “general applicability”—“are not only ‘interrelated,’  . . . but substantially overlap,” 
making a clear distinction unnecessary. Id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
45. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.  
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 534.  
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religious belief.”49 Therefore, if a law is substantially underinclusive in 
that it seems to disproportionately apply only to religious conduct, the 
law is not “generally applied.”50 
Thus, Smith currently sets the baseline standard for cases arising 
under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.51 Parties seeking 
heightened scrutiny of a law burdening free exercise of religion must 
demonstrate that the law is not neutral or generally applicable, as those 
terms are understood in light of Lukumi. 
II. THE WASHINGTON PHARMACY RULES ARE NEUTRAL 
AND GENERALLY APPLICABLE AND SHOULD 
WITHSTAND RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY 
In Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky,52 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was 
called upon to determine whether Washington’s pharmacy rules are 
neutral and generally applicable.53 The pharmacy rules impose upon 
pharmacies affirmative duties that could potentially clash with personal 
religious convictions.54 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit held in Stormans 
that the rules do not target religion specifically, but rather apply 
neutrally to all pharmacists.55 The court’s analysis is consistent with 
Smith, as evidenced by similar cases interpreting the scope of the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.56 Ultimately, the court noted that 
                                                     
49. Id. at 543. 
50. Id. (noting that the challenged ordinances are underinclusive to the ends of protecting public 
health and preventing cruelty to animals). The Court also declined to “define with precision the 
standard used to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general application” because in its view the 
challenged ordinances fell well below the standard. Id.  
51. The Court has since reaffirmed its Smith holding despite legislative attempts to subvert it. In 
1993, Congress responded to the Court’s holding in Smith by passing the Religious Freedom and 
Restoration Act (RFRA). Pub. L. No. 103-141 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1–4 
(1994)). This law sought to override Smith and restore the Court’s prior free exercise analysis 
originally articulated in Sherbert. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a). The Court declared this act 
unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores. 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). In this case, the Archbishop 
of San Antonio applied for a construction permit to make alterations to the St. Peter Catholic 
Church in Boerne, Texas. Id. at 512. The city denied the application relying on a recently passed 
historic landmark preservation ordinance. The Archbishop brought suit relying on the RFRA. Id. at 
511–12. The Court held that the law exceeded Congress’ enforcement powers under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 532.  
52. 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). 
53. Id. at 1127–28. 
54. See id. at 1120–22. 
55. Id. at 1113. 
56. See, e.g., N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 959, 965–68 
(Cal. Sup. Ct. 2008); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 81–89 
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the State’s interests in the rules were legitimate and remanded the case to 
the district court to apply rational basis scrutiny.57 
A. Washington’s Requirement that Pharmacies Timely Deliver Lawful 
Medications May Burden Free Exercise of Religion 
A rule requiring pharmacies to dispense medications despite religious 
objection has the potential to interfere with private free exercise. The 
Washington State Board of Pharmacy58 no doubt acknowledged this fact 
when it adopted the rules. After receiving some queries on the subject, 
the Board, in August 2005, began to discuss what it could do about 
pharmacists who declined to dispense emergency contraceptives.59 After 
concluding that existing statutes and regulations were unclear, the Board 
considered adopting new rules to clarify that such conduct would be 
deemed unprofessional and punishable with action against pharmacists’ 
licenses.60 To this end, the Board underwent a lengthy rule-adoption 
process, soliciting numerous comments from interested parties.61 Most 
of the comments focused on whether pharmacists should be allowed to 
refuse to dispense a lawful prescription for the post-coital emergency 
contraceptive Plan B.62 Eventually, the Board adopted two rules: (1) an 
amendment to an existing regulation governing individual pharmacists,63 
and (2) a new regulation governing pharmacies.64 The new rules took 
effect July 26, 2007.65 
                                                     
(Cal. Sup. Ct. 2004); Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 463–65 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 2006). 
57. Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1137–38. 
58. Washington State has established a state Board of Pharmacy to regulate, enforce laws, 
establish licensing qualifications, and promulgate rules pertaining to pharmacy practice within the 
state. See WASH. REV. CODE § 18.64.005 (1990). 
59. The Board specifically discussed what, if any, disciplinary actions it could take against 
pharmacists who confiscate or destroy customers’ prescriptions for emergency contraceptives. Brief 
for the Appellants, supra note 11, at 9–10.  
60. Id. at 10. 
61. The formal process began in January 2006. The Board went through six distinct drafts and, 
working with the Governor’s office, consulted various groups including Planned Parenthood, the 
State Pharmacy Association, the Northwest Women’s Law Center, and the Department of Health. 
Id. at 9–11. 
62. Id. at 11–12. 
63. 07-14 Wash. Reg. 25 (July 26, 2007) (codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-863-095 
(2007)). 
64. Id. (codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-010 (2007)). 
65. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 246-863-095, 246-869-010 (2007). 
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Under the new rules, pharmacies have a duty to “deliver lawfully 
prescribed drugs or devices to patients and to distribute drugs and 
devices approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for 
restricted distribution by pharmacies, or provide a therapeutically 
equivalent drug or device in a timely manner consistent with reasonable 
expectations for filling the prescription”66 except in certain specified 
circumstances.67 In a Concise Explanatory Statement68 accompanying 
the regulations, the Board explained that a pharmacy may 
“accommodate” an individual pharmacist who has a religious or moral 
objection, but the pharmacy itself still has a duty to timely deliver 
lawfully prescribed medications.69 A pharmacy may accommodate a 
pharmacist’s personal objections in any way it considers appropriate, 
including having another pharmacist available in person or via 
telephone.70 Moreover, both pharmacies and pharmacists are prohibited 
from destroying or refusing to return an unfilled lawful prescription; 
violating a patient’s privacy; or unlawfully discriminating against, 
intimidating, or harassing a patient.71 Pharmacies or pharmacists who 
violate these regulations face disciplinary action, including revocation of 
their state licenses.72 
Though these rules are not framed in religious terms, they might, 
nonetheless, conflict with free exercise rights. As certain commentators 
have noted, many who object to the use of emergency contraception are 
guided by religious scruples.73 Under the rules, Washington pharmacists 
                                                     
66. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-010(1) (2007).  
67. See § 246-869-010(1)(a)–(e), (2) (2007) (exempting pharmacies from the general duty to 
deliver when the prescription cannot be filled due to lack of payment, because it may be fraudulent 
or erroneous, or because of declared emergencies, lack of specialized equipment or expertise, or 
unavailability of a drug despite good faith compliance with WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-150 
(1991), which provides in part: “The pharmacy must maintain at all times a representative 
assortment of drugs in order to meet the pharmaceutical needs of its patients.”). 
68. Before adopting a proposed rule, a Washington State agency must prepare a concise 
explanatory statement of the rule. This statement must: (1) identify the reasons for adopting the rule; 
(2) describe differences between the text of the proposed rule as published in the register and the 
text of adopted rule, stating the reason for differences; and (3) summarize all comments received 
pertaining to the proposed rule and respond to those comments. WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 34.05.325(6)(a)(i)–(iii) (2009). 
69. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2009). 
70. Id. 
71. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 246-863-095(4)(a)–(e), 246-869-010(4)(a)–(e) (2007).  
72. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.64.165 (1995). 
73. For instance, the official doctrine of the Catholic Church and some conservative Christian 
denominations holds that the use of emergency contraception, as well as other forms of birth 
control, amounts to an immoral taking of a human life. See Smearman, supra note 9, at 490–91. 
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or pharmacy owners who subscribe to such beliefs face a tension 
between faith and professional obligation. For example, pharmacy 
owners who, despite local demand, refuse to carry or distribute Plan B or 
a similar drug solely for religious reasons could lose their pharmacies.74 
Less directly—but no less significantly—an individual pharmacist who 
refuses to distribute medications based on religious beliefs may face a 
market where many employers are unable or unwilling to accommodate 
those beliefs.75 These two situations demonstrate the potential conflict 
between the pharmacy rules and free exercise of religion. 
B. In Stormans, the Ninth Circuit Held that Washington’s Newly 
Adopted Pharmacy Rules Are Neutral and Generally Applicable 
Although these rules might clash with religious beliefs, they do not 
violate the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause if they are neutral 
and generally applicable.76 In Stormans, the Ninth Circuit examined this 
issue and ultimately determined that the regulations neither expressly 
reference nor otherwise target pharmacists’ religious beliefs.77 The court 
also concluded that the rules do not “selective[ly] . . . impose[] burdens 
only on conduct motivated by religion.”78 Thus, the rules are neutral and 
generally applicable and need only withstand rational basis scrutiny.79 
The day before the new regulations took effect, Stormans Inc., a 
business operating a pharmacy located in Olympia, Washington, and two 
individual pharmacists filed a lawsuit against the Board and other state 
representatives in federal court,80 alleging that the rules violated the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.81 The plaintiffs, contending 
that their personal religious views did not permit them to dispense the 
                                                     
74. See Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1120–21; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 18.64.165 (1995); 
Complaint, supra note 21, 8–9. 
75. See Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1121–22. 
76. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
77. Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1130–34. 
78. Id. at 1134 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
543 (1993)). 
79. Id. at 1137–38. 
80. Complaint, supra note 21, at 1–3. 
81. Id. at 16–17. Plaintiffs also argued that the pharmacy regulations violated the Equal 
Protection Clause, id. at 13–15, the Supremacy Clause, id. at 15–16, and procedural due process, id. 
at 17. 
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drug Plan B,82 sought a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of 
the new rules.83 
District Court Judge Ronald B. Leighton granted the plaintiffs a 
preliminary injunction based solely on their federal free exercise claim.84 
Although he acknowledged that the newly-adopted regulations were 
neutral on their face, he nonetheless found that the regulations were 
neither neutral85 nor generally applicable.86 The court cited Lukumi for 
the principle that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause protects against 
government hostility which is masked, as well as overt.”87 After 
examining the background and legislative history of the regulations, 
Judge Leighton determined that the “overriding objective” of the rules 
was “to eliminate moral and religious objections from the business of 
dispensing medication.”88 He further maintained that because the 
“means” were not consistent with the “ends” advanced by the State, the 
regulations were not generally applicable but rather “target[ed] religious 
practice in a way forbidden by the Constitution.”89 Therefore, the district 
court applied strict scrutiny consistent with Lukumi and ultimately 
concluded that the regulations neither advance a compelling government 
interest nor are narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.90 
The Ninth Circuit found Judge Leighton’s analysis unpersuasive.91 
Circuit Judge Kim M. Wardlaw, writing for the unanimous three-judge 
panel,92 reasoned that the regulations were neutral.93 As Judge Wardlaw 
explained, the regulations “do not suppress, target, or single out the 
                                                     
82. Id. at 2. 
83. Id. at 18. 
84. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2007).  
85. Id. at 1257–60. 
86. Id. at 1260–63. 
87. Id. at 1258 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
534 (1993)). 
88. Id. at 1259. 
89. Id. at 1263. 
90. Id. at 1263–64. 
91. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1130–37 (9th Cir. 2009).  
92. In the Ninth Circuit’s first hearing of Stormans, Circuit Judge Clifton wrote a separate 
concurring opinion. 571 F.3d 960, 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (Clifton, J., concurring). Judge Clifton 
disagreed with the majority’s original position that a court should not consider legislative history in 
assessing whether a law is neutral and generally applicable. Id. at 992. Upon a panel rehearing, the 
court issued a new unanimous opinion stating that the law is unclear as to whether legislative 
history is relevant to neutrality and general applicability. Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1113, 1131–34. The 
plaintiffs’ petition for en banc review was denied. Id. at 1113.  
93. Id. at 1131. 
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practice of any religion because of religious content.”94 Additionally, the 
court rejected the lower court’s finding that the “object” of the rules was 
to “eliminate from the practice of pharmacy . . . those pharmacists who, 
for religious reasons, object to the delivery of lawful medications.”95 The 
court noted that the regulations’ potential to disproportionately affect 
pharmacists with religious objections did not deprive the rules of their 
neutrality.96 The Ninth Circuit further found that Judge Leighton 
overemphasized the rules’ developmental history, stating that the district 
court’s assessment of the history “reveals little about the Board’s 
motivation in adopting the rules, and, to the extent it does reveal 
anything, it indicates that the Board’s concern was to promote the public 
welfare, not to burden religious belief.”97 Thus, the rules are sufficiently 
neutral. 
Turning to general applicability, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district 
court’s “means/ends” approach, noting that the proper standard was one 
of “substantial underinclusiveness.”98 Under this standard, a law is 
generally applicable if it “selective[ly] . . . impose[s] burdens only on 
conduct motivated by religious belief.”99 Satisfied that “[t]he new rules 
apply to all lawful medications, not just those that pharmacies or 
pharmacists may oppose for religious reasons,” the court held the 
pharmacy regulations to be generally applicable.100 The court recognized 
that the rules did not punish all refusals to distribute medications 
because pharmacies could decline distribution for certain enumerated 
reasons, such as failure to pay or presentation of a potentially fraudulent 
prescription.101 But, as the court recognized, the “absence of these 
exemptions would likely drive pharmacies out of business or, even more 
absurdly, mandate unsafe practices.”102 As such, these narrow exceptions 
do not impair the rules’ general applicability.103 
                                                     
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 1133–34. The court also highlighted its uncertainty on whether it was proper under 
Lukumi to consider a law’s history when assessing a law’s neutrality. Id. at 1131–34. 
98. Id. at 1134. 
99. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993). 
100. Id. at 1134. 
101. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-010(1)(a)–(e),(2) (2007); see also Stormans, 586 F.3d 
at 1134–35. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit recognized the regulations to be neutral and 
generally applicable, and remanded the case to the district court to apply 
rational basis review.104 To withstand this level of scrutiny, the plaintiffs 
must negate “every conceivable basis which might support” the laws.105 
Given the Ninth Circuit’s recognition that Washington’s interest in 
“ensuring that its citizen-patients receive lawfully prescribed 
medications without delay” is legitimate, the plaintiffs’ chances of 
success on this front appear relatively slim.106 
C. Free Exercise Cases in Other Jurisdictions Are in Line with the 
Ninth Circuit’s Conclusion that Washington’s Pharmacy Rules Are 
Neutral and Generally Applicable 
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Stormans is consistent with those issued 
by other appellate courts in similar cases. In each of these cases, the 
respective court reached the same conclusions as the Ninth Circuit with 
regard to neutrality and general applicability. 
In Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court,107 the 
California State Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the 
Women’s Contraception Equity Act (WCEA),108 which required certain 
employers to provide health and disability insurance covering 
prescription contraceptives.109 The plaintiff, Catholic Charities, an 
independently incorporated nonprofit public benefit corporation with ties 
to the Catholic Church, argued that the statute violated the First 
                                                     
104. Id. at 1137–38. 
105. Id. at 1137 (citing Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). 
106. Id. This conclusion assumes that the pharmacy rules remain unchanged. In July 2010, the 
Board announced its intent to initiate a new rulemaking process with the apparent goal of allowing 
pharmacies to refuse to dispense Plan B provided they refer patients to another pharmacy. Schrader, 
supra note 22, at A1, A8. Based on this announcement, the district court ordered a stay of further 
proceedings for an indefinite period pending the outcome of the rulemaking process. Order Granting 
Motion for Trial Continuance, Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, No. C07-5374RBL (W.D. Wash. July 12, 
2010). The Office of the Governor, however, has not swayed from its original position. In a letter to 
the State Attorney General’s Office, General Counsel for the Governor expressed “concern[] about 
whether rule changes would provide meaningful access to lawfully prescribed medications” and 
would seek “to ensure that the access now available is protected or enhanced.” Letter from Narda 
Pierce, General Counsel, Office of Governor Christine Gregoire, to Rene Tomisser, Senior Counsel, 
and Joyce A. Roper, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Washington State Attorney General’s 
Office (July 9, 2010) (on file with author).  
107. 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
108. This act comprises two laws, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (2002) and CAL. 
INS. CODE § 10123.196 (1999). See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 85 P.3d at 73 n.1. 
109. 85 P.3d at 73.  
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Amendment and the California constitution.110 The WCEA exempted 
“religious employer[s]” from providing “contraceptive methods that are 
contrary to the . . . employer’s religious tenets.”111 This exemption, 
however, did not extend to independent corporations like Catholic 
Charities.112 In its First Amendment analysis, the Court concluded that 
the WCEA was a neutral law of general applicability.113 The Court 
rejected the plaintiff’s contentions that the law selectively targeted 
religious charitable organizations such as Catholic Charities.114 Citing 
Lukumi, the Court concluded that because the WCEA applies to all 
nonreligious employers engaged in charitable work regardless of their 
personal religious ideologies, “no argument can logically be made that 
the WCEA imposes a burden on charitable social work only when 
performed for religious reasons.”115 Moreover, the exemption for certain 
religious employers, in the Court’s view, did not defeat the rules’ 
neutrality, but rather was a “justifiable . . . accommodation of religious 
exercise.”116 
A second example of a court rejecting a free exercise challenge to a 
state health services statute is Catholic Charities of the Diocese of 
Albany v. Serio.117 In this case, the New York Court of Appeals 
considered the constitutionality of the Women’s Health and Wellness 
Act (WHWA),118 a statute very similar to California’s WCEA.119 Like 
the California State Supreme Court in Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 
the Serio court concluded that the statute was neutral and generally 
applied, noting that “[r]eligious beliefs were not the ‘target’ of the 
WHWA . . . .”120 Rather, the act’s “object was to make broader health 
                                                     
110. Id. at 73, 75.  
111. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b) (2002); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196(2)(d) 
(1999). 
112. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 85 P.3d at 75. 
113. Id. at 81−84. 
114. Id. at 84−87. 
115. Id. at 86. 
116. Id. at 84. The Court added that, if anything, the WCEA benefits religions like the Catholic 
Church. Id. at 83–85 & n.9. Specifically, the Court stated “the WCEA refers to the religious 
characteristics of organizations in order to identify and exempt those organizations from an 
otherwise generally applicable duty.” Id. at 83 (emphasis in original). This benefit, however, did not 
go so far as to offend the First Amendment Establishment Clause. Id. at 85 n.9. 
117. 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2006). 
118. N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 3221(l)(16), 4303(cc) (2002).  
119. Like California’s WCEA, the WHWA requires an employer health insurance agreement to 
“include coverage for the cost of contraceptive drugs or devices.” Id. 
120. Serio, 859 N.E.2d at 464. 
113010_Horton_Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/3/2010  6:08 PM 
2010] “PLAN B” AND RELIGIOUS PHARMACISTS 753 
 
insurance coverage available to women and, by that means, both to 
improve women’s health and to eliminate disparities between men and 
women in the cost of health care.”121 
Similarly, in North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. 
Superior Court,122 the California Supreme Court scrutinized a health 
services law. In that case, the plaintiff was a lesbian who sought fertility 
treatment from the defendant North Coast Medical Group, Inc.123 A 
physician employed by North Coast contended that her religious beliefs 
prevented her from conducting an intrauterine insemination on the 
plaintiff.124 The plaintiff sued North Coast on multiple theories, 
including that the refusal amounted to discrimination based on sexual 
orientation in violation of California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act.125 North 
Coast argued that its refusal was protected by free exercise rights 
guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions.126 
The California State Supreme Court stated that the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act is “a valid and neutral law of general applicability.”127 In its brief 
First Amendment free exercise analysis, the Court recognized that the 
Act posed at most “an incidental conflict with . . . religious beliefs,” and, 
therefore, under Smith and Lukumi the Free Exercise Clause did not 
shield physicians from conforming with the Act’s antidiscrimination 
requirements.128 
The statutes at issue in Catholic Charities of Sacramento and Serio 
required private employers to provide a medical benefit to employees for 
                                                     
121. Id. 
122. 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
123. Id. at 963. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 964. The Unruh Civil Rights Act’s antidiscrimination provisions apply to business 
establishments that offer to the public “accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or 
services.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (2005); see also Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy 
Scouts, 952 P.2d 218, 237−38 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1998); Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 
896 P.2d 776, 793 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1995). California courts have held that a medical group providing 
medical services to the public is a business establishment for purposes of the Act. Leach v. 
Drummond Medical Group, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 362, 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
126. North Coast, 189 P.3d at 964. 
127. Id. at 966 (quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 
(1990)).  
128. Id. at 966–67. The Court subsequently went on to apply strict scrutiny to the Act based on its 
interpretation of California’s Constitution. Id. at 968–69. The Court’s analysis in this area is 
discussed in additional detail in a later section of this Comment. See infra Part V.B.4.  
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public health reasons.129 In North Coast, the challenged statute imposed 
affirmative requirements on medical professionals to perform health 
services for the general public.130 Recognizing public health (rather than 
religious meddling) to be the State’s motivation, the highest courts of 
both New York and California, like the Ninth Circuit in Stormans, 
deemed those states’ respective acts neutral and generally applied.131 
These cases demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling is in line with the 
Supreme Court’s Smith and Lukumi decisions. As such, the pharmacy 
rules do not violate the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. 
III. THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION PROTECTS 
FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS MORE THAN THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 
The First Amendment provides merely a national “floor” for free 
exercise rights.132 An individual state may provide more protection 
through its own state constitution.133 Although a state’s neutral and 
generally applied law may be constitutional under the First Amendment, 
the same law may be invalid if it violates the state constitution.134 The 
Washington State Supreme Court has interpreted its constitution in this 
manner, requiring the State to demonstrate that any law having a 
coercive effect on free exercise of religion satisfies strict scrutiny, in 
contrast to the rational basis scrutiny mandated by the First 
Amendment.135 
A. The Washington State Supreme Court Has Held that the 
Washington State Constitution Protects Free Exercise Rights More 
Than the Federal Constitution 
The Washington State Constitution has a distinct provision protecting 
free exercise of religion—article I, section 11. When compared to the 
                                                     
129. Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 74 (Cal. 
Sup. Ct. 2004); Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d, 459, 461 (N.Y. 
Ct. App. 2006). 
130. North Coast, 189 P.3d at 965. 
131. Id. at 966; Serio, 859 N.E.2d at 464; Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 85 P.3d at 82. 
132. See G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REV. 73, 80 (1989). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 226–27, 840 P.2d 174, 187 
(1992); Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 199, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (1997). 
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language of the First Amendment, the text of article I, section 11 appears 
to provide more affirmative protection for religious freedom:136 
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious 
sentiment, belief, and worship, shall be guaranteed to every 
individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person 
or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience 
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of 
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace 
and safety of the state.137 
In First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle,138 the Washington State 
Supreme Court concluded that article I, section 11 is in fact more 
protective than the First Amendment.139 In its analysis,140 the Court 
determined that the free exercise language in the Washington State 
Constitution is stronger than that found in the First Amendment.141 
Specifically, article I, section 11 “absolutely” protects freedom of 
worship rather than limiting government action, guarantees that no 
person shall be “disturbed” on the basis of religion, and safeguards all 
religious conduct so long as it is not “licentious” or inconsistent with 
public “peace and safety.”142 The Court also noted structural and 
historical differences between the federal and state constitutions that 
justify broader protection of free exercise rights under article I, 
                                                     
136. See First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 224, 840 P.2d at 186. 
137. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
138. 120 Wash. 2d 203, 840 P.2d 174 (1992). In this case, a church brought a free exercise 
challenge against a Landmarks Preservation Ordinance. The law required church officials, whose 
building had been declared a historical landmark, to obtain a certificate of approval from the city 
before it made any alterations to the church building’s exterior. Id. at 208–09, 840 P.2d at 177–78. 
139. Id. at 223–26, 840 P.2d at 186–87. 
140. The comparison of federal and state constitutional provisions is generally referred to as the 
“dual sovereignty” approach and was expressly adopted by the Washington State Supreme Court in 
State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 378, 679 P.2d 353, 361 (1984). See Robert F. Utter, The Practice of 
Principled Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism: Washington’s Experience, 65 TEMPLE L. 
REV. 1153, 1160 (1992). Under this approach, where state and federal constitutional protections are 
substantially different, the court must analyze both the state and federal constitutional provisions, 
even when the holding rests entirely on the state constitution. See id. To determine whether the state 
constitution provides different protections than analogous provisions of the U.S. Constitution, the 
Washington State Supreme Court in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), 
articulated six key considerations: (1) the textual language of the state constitution, (2) significant 
differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions, (3) state 
constitutional and common law history, (4) preexisting state law, (5) differences in structure 
between the federal and state constitutions, and (6) matters of particular state interest or local 
concern. Id. at 61–62, 720 P.2d at 812–13.  
141. First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 224, 840 P.2d at 186. 
142. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 224; 840 P.2d at 186 
(explaining differences between First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and Art. I, § 11). 
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section 11.143 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that a broader 
interpretation was appropriate because the Washington State 
Constitution limits the “plenary power of the State to do anything not 
expressly forbidden by state constitution or federal law,” in contrast to 
the U.S. Constitution, which “grant[s] . . . [the federal government] 
limited power . . . to exercise only those constitutionally enumerated 
powers that the States expressly delegate to it.”144 Thus, article I, 
section 11 more broadly protects free exercise rights than the First 
Amendment. 
After concluding that article I, section 11 was generally more 
protective than the First Amendment with respect to free exercise rights, 
the Court in First Covenant expressly stated that “[a] facially neutral, 
even-handedly enforced statute that does not directly burden free 
exercise may, nonetheless, violate article 1, section 11, if it indirectly 
burdens the exercise of religion.”145 Consequently, Smith’s requirement 
of rational basis scrutiny would not guide a court’s analysis in a free 
exercise challenge brought under the Washington State Constitution.146 
B. If a Washington Law Has a Coercive Effect on Religion, the State 
Must Show It Has Adopted the Least Restrictive Means to Achieve 
a Compelling Interest 
After recognizing that article I, section 11 is more protective than the 
First Amendment, the Washington State Supreme Court in First 
Covenant specified that any law burdening free exercise must satisfy 
strict scrutiny.147 In Munns v. Martin,148 the Court clarified this 
interpretation when it expressly stated that it had adopted the Sherbert 
standard for constitutionality.149 Under that standard, the complaining 
                                                     
143. First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 224–25, 840 P.2d at 186. 
144. Id. at 225, 840 P.2d at 186. 
145. Id. at 226, 840 P.2d at 187 (citing Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 7–8, 639 
P.2d 1358, 1362 (1982); State ex rel. Bolling v. Superior Court, 16 Wash. 2d 373, 385–86, 133 P.2d 
803, 809 (1943)). 
146. See First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 223–25, 840 P.2d at 185–86 (explaining that the 
Washington State Constitution provides greater protection for religious freedom, and noting that 
“we eschew the uncertainty of Smith II and rest our decision also on independent grounds under the 
Washington State Constitution”). 
147. First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 226–27, 840 P.2d at 187. 
148. 131 Wash. 2d 192, 930 P.2d 318 (1997). In this case, individual parishioners sought to 
enjoin church officials from demolishing a church-run school in Walla Walla. The church officials 
argued that any prohibition against their procuring a demolition permit violated free exercise 
protections under article I, section 11. Id. at 196–97, 930 P.2d at 319–20. 
149. Id. at 199, 930 P.2d at 321. 
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party carries the initial burden to prove the state action has a “coercive 
effect” on religious practice.150 Once a coercive effect is established, the 
burden of proof shifts to the State to show the action serves a compelling 
government interest and employs the least restrictive means to achieve 
that interest.151 
Thus, the Washington State Supreme Court has effectively made 
Smith inapplicable to its free exercise jurisprudence, at least in the state 
constitutional context. A Washington law burdening the free exercise of 
religion—even one that is neutral and generally applied—withstands an 
article I, section 11 challenge only if it satisfies strict scrutiny.152 
IV. A WASHINGTON LAW PROMOTING MEDICAL CARE OR 
TREATMENT WILL LIKELY WITHSTAND SCRUTINY 
UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 
Although a party asserting a free exercise challenge must first 
demonstrate that a law has a coercive effect on religion, a review of the 
free exercise cases indicates that Washington courts have set the bar 
fairly low in this area, requiring the party merely to show the party has a 
“sincere” religious belief that is actually burdened by the law.153 
Provided a complainant makes this showing, the State must demonstrate 
that the law serves a compelling interest and employs the least restrictive 
means to achieve that interest.154 Although this strict scrutiny standard is 
often difficult to meet,155 it is by no means insurmountable. State actions 
that directly relate to public health, peace, or safety are particularly 
likely to withstand strict scrutiny even in free exercise cases.156 
Washington courts have recognized that promoting or advancing 
medical services is a valid public health interest.157 Therefore, a 
                                                     
150. Id. (citing First United Methodist Church v. Hearings Exam’r for the Seattle Landmarks 
Pres. Bd., 129 Wash. 2d 238, 246, 916 P.2d 374, 378 (1996)). 
151. Id. 
152. First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 226, 840 P.2d at 187. 
153. See infra Part I.V.A. 
154. See supra Part III.B. 
155. Professor Gerald Gunther of Harvard Law School has described the standard as “‘strict’ in 
theory and fatal in fact,” at least when applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in Equal Protection cases. 
Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).  
156. See First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 226–27, 840 P.2d at 187; City of Sumner v. First 
Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 8–9, 639 P.2d, 1358, 1363 (1982). 
157. See Backlund v. Bd. of Comm’rs of King Cnty. Hospital District, 106 Wash. 2d 632, 642, 
724 P.2d 981, 987 (1986); State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 864, 239 P.2d 
545, 548 (1952); State v. Norman, 61 Wash. App. 16, 23, 808 P.2d 1159, 1163 (1991). 
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Washington court would likely hold that narrowly tailored laws 
promoting medical care or treatment do not offend article I, section 11. 
A. Although Washington Courts Have Set a Fairly Low Threshold for 
Showing a Burden on Free Exercise Rights, the Exact Parameters 
of This Threshold Remain Unclear 
Before a court examines the nature of the State’s interest in a free 
exercise case, the complainant must demonstrate a coercive effect on 
religion.158 To satisfy this requirement, a party must show two things: (1) 
that the religious belief is sincere, and (2) that the government action 
burdens the exercise of religion.159 
Washington courts have rarely dismissed a free exercise challenge 
based on the party’s failure to demonstrate a sincere religious belief, 
suggesting a very low evidentiary threshold.160 Courts have been 
somewhat less willing to find that state action actually burdens those 
sincerely held beliefs.161 However, the ultimate standard for this prong is 
somewhat nebulous. The Washington State Supreme Court provided 
some insight on this issue in City of Woodinville v. Northshore United 
Church of Christ.162 In holding that a city’s refusal to consider a 
church’s conditional land use permit unconstitutionally infringed upon 
free exercise rights, the Court stated that “a burden can be a slight 
inconvenience without violating article I, section 11, but the State cannot 
impose substantial burden on exercise of religion.”163 The Court did not, 
                                                     
158. First United Methodist v. Hearing Exam’r for the Seattle Landmarks Pres. Bd., 129 Wash. 
2d 238, 246, 916 P.2d 374, 378 (1996). 
159. Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 199–200, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (1997). 
160. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Jensen-Branch, 78 Wash. App. 482, 490 n.2, 899 P.2d 803, 808 
n.2 (1995) (noting that “religious beliefs” should be interpreted broadly). But see In re Cook, No. 
17123-0-III, No. 17842-1-III, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 1383, at *10 (Wash. Ct. App. July 27, 1999) 
(father failed to demonstrate sincere religious belief in challenging mother’s decision to place child 
in Christian preschool and daycare). 
161. See, e.g., Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark Cnty., 140 Wash. 2d 143, 166−67, 995 P.2d 
33, 46 (2000) (requiring a church to apply for a conditional use permit not a burden on free 
exercise); State v. Shaughnessy, No. 34506-4-II, 2007 Wash. App. LEXIS 1182, at *11–12 (Wash. 
Ct. App. May 22, 2007) (noting that there was no burden when defendant could not carry his Bible 
to sessions at a court-ordered sexual offender treatment program because the provider was a private 
actor); North Pacific Union Conference Ass’n v. Clark Cnty., 118 Wash. App. 22, 32–33, 74 P.3d 
140, 145–46 (2003) (holding that denial of permit to build a church is not an unconstitutional 
burden).  
162. 166 Wash. 2d 633, 211 P.2d 406 (2009). 
163. Id. at 645, 211 P.2d at 411. 
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however, elaborate on what constitutes a “slight inconvenience” versus a 
“substantial burden.”164 
Although the Washington State Supreme Court has not defined the 
precise scope of its “coercive effect” requirement, its general 
interpretation of the requirement suggests a relatively low standard.165 A 
party need only demonstrate that the government action poses more than 
a “slight inconvenience” to free exercise rights.166 If a party adequately 
shows a coercive effect, the burden shifts to the government to justify its 
action with a compelling government interest.167 
B. Washington Courts Have Recognized Public Health, Peace, and 
Safety to Be Compelling Interests in Free Exercise Cases 
Article I, section 11 expressly notes that free exercise rights may not 
“justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.”168 
It has long been accepted that a state may invoke its general police 
powers to protect public health, peace, and safety.169 Consistent with this 
maxim, the Washington State Supreme Court has recognized even in its 
early free exercise opinions that state interests serving public health, 
peace, and safety are sufficiently compelling. 
                                                     
164. To illustrate the complexities, only nine years before Northshore, the Washington State 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that a county’s requirement that a church procure a 
conditional land use permit burdened free exercise rights. Open Door, 140 Wash. 2d at 166−67, 995 
P.2d at 46. Thus, a county’s refusal to consider a church’s land use permit application burdens free 
exercise, while a general requirement that the church acquire a permit does not. 
165. Indeed, this view reflects the Washington Supreme Court’s recognition in First Covenant 
Church v. City of Seattle that government involvement in a church’s decision about “what is liturgy 
and what is a religious purpose . . . fosters exactly the kind of religious entanglement the [state] 
constitution seeks to avoid.” 120 Wash. 2d 203, 221–22, 840 P.2d 174 184–85 (1992). 
166. See Northshore, 166 Wash. 2d at 644–45, 211 P.2d at 411. 
167. See First United Methodist Church v. Hearings Exam’r for the Seattle Landmarks Pres. Bd., 
129 Wash. 2d 238, 246, 916 P.2d 374, 378 (1996). 
168. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
169. See, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885) (recognizing that no constitutional 
amendment “was designed to interfere with the power of the State, sometimes termed its police 
power, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of 
the people . . . .”); Mayor of the City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 139 (1837) (“[I]t is not 
only the right, but the burden and solemn duty of a state, to advance the safety, happiness and 
prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and every act of legislation, 
which it may deem to be conducive to these ends . . . .”); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 443 
(1827) (“[T]he police power . . . unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the States.”); 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203–04 (1824) (“Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of 
every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State . . . remain subject 
to State legislation” and Congress has “no claim of a direct power to regulate the purely internal 
commerce of a State, or to act directly on its system of police.”); see also Santiago Legarre, The 
Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 770–72, 782–85 (2007).  
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During World War II, in State ex rel. Bolling v. Superior Court,170 the 
Washington State Supreme Court considered a statute requiring school 
children to salute the American flag and recite the pledge of 
allegiance.171 Some children who refused to follow the law for religious 
reasons were expelled and subsequently brought before a juvenile court 
as delinquent children.172 The children’s parents challenged the law 
based on free exercise rights guaranteed by the federal and state 
constitutions.173 The Court stated that religious practice cannot be 
“directly hurtful to the safety, morals, health or general welfare of the 
community,” and that the State may offend “religious scruples” only if it 
has a “clear justification . . . in the necessities of national or community 
life.”174 Nevertheless, the Court refused to enforce the statute.175 
Although the State has an interest in ensuring respect for the flag,176 it 
had no compelling health or safety interest in penalizing children who 
decline to salute the flag or recite the pledge of allegiance for religious 
reasons.177 
The Washington State Supreme Court found that a challenged state 
action furthered health and safety in State ex rel. Holcomb v. 
Armstrong.178 In this case, a university student objected for religious 
reasons to a university’s requirement that all students undergo 
tuberculosis screening.179 The Court upheld the requirement.180 Citing 
article I, section 11 and Bolling, the Court explained that the public 
interest in the health of the university’s students and employees may 
lawfully be protected and that infringement of an individual student’s 
                                                     
170. 16 Wash. 2d 373, 133 P.2d 803 (1943). 
171. Id. at 374–75, 133 P.2d at 805. 
172. Id. at 375, 133 P.2d at 805. 
173. Id. at 377–78, 133 P.2d at 806. 
174. Id. at 384–85, 133 P.2d at 808–09 (quoting Barnette v. West Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. 
Supp. 251, 253–54 (S.D.W. Va. 1942)). 
175. Id. at 387–88, 133 P.2d at 809–10. 
176. Id. at 387, 133 P.2d at 809 (“Respect for our flag as a symbol of our country is part of our 
way of life, and disrespect to the flag constitutes an offense against our laws.”). 
177. Id., 133 P.2d at 809–10. On the contrary, the Court recognized that “the children  . . . by 
standing respectfully at attention during the exercises comprising the salute to the flag, will show 
due respect” for the flag and that excusing children who object to reciting the pledge based on 
religious beliefs “should impress not only those who claim the privilege of following their religious 
convictions, but all others, with the fact that the flag protects each citizen, and that the government 
of which it is the symbol guarantees to all religious liberty.” Id. 
178. 39 Wash. 2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952). 
179. Id. at 861, 239 P.2d at 546; see also infra Part V.B.2. 
180. Holcomb, 39 Wash. 2d at 863–64, 239 P.2d at 548. 
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free exercise rights was necessary to prevent a “clear and present, grave 
and immediate” danger.181 
Washington courts continue to recognize the State’s police interest in 
public health, peace, and safety as compelling.182 If the State can show 
that a law burdening free exercise directly advances this interest, the law 
would very likely survive scrutiny under article I, section 11. 
C. Washington Courts Have Recognized that Providing Medical Care 
or Treatment Promotes Public Health, Peace, and Safety 
One can readily assert that a particular law promotes public health, 
peace, or safety. Convincing a Washington court that this is so is another 
matter altogether. The precise limits of the State’s police power have 
proven somewhat elusive. Even the U.S. Supreme Court has proven 
unable to define the power’s limits.183 The Washington State Supreme 
Court has taken a fairly broad view of the police power, generally 
requiring only that a law or regulation be “reasonably related” to public 
health, peace, or safety.184 With this broad view, Washington courts have 
interpreted the power to cover a wide range of state actions.185 
                                                     
181. Id. 
182. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d. 203, 226–27, 840 P.2d 174, 187 
(1992); Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 639 P.2d 1358, 1363 (1982); State v. 
Norman, 61 Wash. App 16, 24, 808 P.2d 1159, 1163 (1991). 
183. See Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (“The line which 
 . . . separates the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of [the police] power is not capable of 
precise delimitation.”); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 142 (1912) (“[The police 
power] is not susceptible of circumstantial precision.”). 
184. See Pretsel, Inc. v. Cnty. of King, 77 Wash. 2d 144, 154, 459 P.2d 937, 942 (1969) (“[A]ny 
legislation under the police power must be reasonably necessary in the interest of public health, 
safety, morals, and the general welfare.”); Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 153, 53 P.2d 615, 619 
(1936) (“[T]he only limitation upon [the police power] is that it must reasonably tend to correct 
some evil or promote some interest of the state, and not violate any direct or positive mandate of the 
constitution.”); Patton v. City of Bellingham, 179 Wash. 566, 572, 38 P.2d 364, 366 (1934) (“The 
grant of police power to a city carries with it the necessary implication that its exercise must be 
reasonable.”). For a historical analysis of the use of the police power in Washington, see Hugh D. 
Spitzer, Municipal Police Power in Washington State, 75 WASH. L. REV. 495 (2000). 
185. See, e.g., Weden v. San Juan Cnty., 135 Wash. 2d 678, 684, 695, 958 P.2d 273, 276, 282 
(1998) (interpreting permitting regulation of personal watercraft); CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 
782, 806, 928 P.2d 1054, 1066 (1996) (allowing for construction of a publicly owned baseball 
stadium); Lenci v. City of Seattle, 63 Wash. 2d 664, 672, 388 P.2d 926, 932 (1964) (upholding 
screening around auto wrecking yards); see also Spitzer, supra note 184, at 505–06. For some 
examples in the free exercise context, see, e.g., State v. Key, No. 16415-2-III, 1999 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 546, at *7–8 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1999) (justified a requirement that defendant felon as 
part of conditional release be required to submit to random urinalysis tests which interfered with his 
religious fast); State v. Balzer, 91 Wash. App. 44, 50, 65–67, 954 P.2d 931, 934, 941–42 (1998) 
(justified making marijuana a Schedule I controlled substance despite marijuana’s use in religious 
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Washington courts’ treatment of the proper scope of the police power 
has been a bit erratic in free exercise cases, but their stance is clearer in 
certain specific areas such as historic landmark preservation186 and child 
safety.187 Washington courts have generally maintained that in 
exercising its police powers, the State may enact laws promoting 
medical care or treatment without offending article I, section 11. 
The Washington State Supreme Court’s decision in Holcomb in 1952, 
discussed previously, stands as one example of a state court determining 
that public medical interests supersede personal religious convictions.188 
Decades later, in State v. Norman,189 a Washington court again faced the 
task of balancing the State’s interest in medical care against personal 
free exercise rights. For religious reasons, a father refused to allow 
medical treatment for his child, who suffered from juvenile diabetes. The 
child’s condition worsened, and he later died.190 After being convicted of 
first degree manslaughter, the father appealed his conviction arguing that 
his inaction was protected under article I, section 11.191 The Washington 
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.192 After noting the State’s 
general interest in child safety,193 the court specifically noted that 
“failure to acquire medical care to an ailing child was an act which was 
inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.”194 Thus, the court in 
                                                     
prayer ceremonies); State v. Clifford, 57 Wash. App. 127, 130−34, 787 P.2d 571, 573–75 (1990) 
(upheld justified driver’s license requirement despite belief that the requirement violates religious 
convictions). 
186. Washington courts have been reluctant to find that a law furthers legitimate public health, 
peace, or safety where the state’s interest is limited to landmark preservation. See Munns v. Martin, 
131 Wash. 2d 192, 201, 930 P.2d. 318, 322 (1997) (quoting First Covenant, 30 Wash. 2d at 222, 
840 P.2d at 185) (“Preservation ordinances further cultural and aesthetic interests, but they do not 
protect public health or safety.”); accord First United Methodist Church v. Hearings Exam’r for the 
Seattle Landmarks Pres. Bd., 129 Wash. 2d 238, 250, 916 P.2d 347, 380 (1996). 
187. Laws protecting children will generally be interpreted by Washington court as compelling. 
See State v. Motherwell, 114 Wash. 2d 353, 365, 788 P.2d 1066, 1072 (1990) (“[T]he State’s 
interest in the protection of children is unquestionably of the utmost importance.”); Sumner v. First 
Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 8–9, 639 P.2d 1358, 1363 (1982) (“[T]here is a valid state interest in 
applying reasonable health, fire and safety standards to private, religious schools.”); State v. 
Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 741, 612 P.2d 795, 799 (1980) (“[T]he State has a compelling interest” 
in “safeguard[ing] the constitutional rights of a child.”). 
188. See supra notes 178–181 and accompanying text. 
189. 61 Wash. App. 16, 808 P.2d 1159 (1991). 
190. Id. at 19–20, 117 P.2d at 1160–61. 
191. Id. at 18, 117 P.2d at 1160.  
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 23, 117 P.2d at 1163 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944)). 
194. Id. (citing People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243, 246–47 (N.Y. App. 1903)) (emphasis added). 
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Norman explicitly recognized the State’s compelling interest in 
providing medical care, at least in certain circumstances.195 
The Washington State Supreme Court considered an article I, 
section 11 claim brought by a medical professional in Backlund v. Board 
of Commissioners.196 In that case, an orthopedic surgeon refused to 
purchase professional liability insurance contrary to the public hospital’s 
policy.197 The surgeon contended that his religious beliefs precluded him 
from carrying any insurance.198 Though the hospital board determined 
the surgeon’s beliefs were “sincerely held,” it nonetheless terminated the 
surgeon’s hospital privileges.199 The surgeon appealed the board’s 
decision to the Superior Court for King County, contending that the 
board’s ruling violated his free exercise rights.200 The court reversed the 
board’s decision, but on review, the Washington State Supreme Court 
reinstated the board’s original ruling.201 After stating that “health and 
welfare regulations curtailing the free exercise of religion are 
justified,”202 the Court emphasized that hospitals have a duty to 
“adequately provide compensation to patients injured through the 
negligence of the hospital and the hospital staff . . . .”203 The Court also 
highlighted the board’s findings that rescinding the insurance 
requirement would negatively affect the hospital.204 Those findings, the 
Court reasoned, “amply support the conclusion that there is a compelling 
governmental interest involved.”205 So, in Backlund, a Washington court 
again determined the State has a strong interest in furthering medical 
care. 
                                                     
195. Id. 
196. 106 Wash. 2d 632, 724 P.2d 981 (1986). 
197. Id. at 634–35, 724 P.2d at 982−83. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 635–37, 724 P.2d at 983–84. 
200. Id. at 637, 724 P.2d at 984. 
201. Id. at 634, 724 P.2d at 982. 
202. Id. at 644, 724 P.2d at 988. The Court also specifically recognized health and safety interests 
that other jurisdictions found sufficient to overcome free exercise claims, including: vaccinations, 
id. at 642, 724 P.2d at 987 (citing Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)); blood 
transfusions for a child over the parents’ religious objections, id. (citing Jehovah’s Witnesses v. 
King Cnty. Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash 1967)); and requiring a child to undergo cancer 
treatment over parents’ objections, id. (citing In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1983)). 
203. Id. at 645, 724 P.2d at 989. 
204. Id. at 644–45, 724 P.2d at 988–89. 
205. Id. at 645, 724 P.2d at 989. 
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Holcomb, Norman, and Backlund involved very different government 
actions. But each of those actions furthered legitimate medical interests: 
preventing the spread of disease,206 providing medical care to children,207 
promoting efficient hospitals, and ensuring adequate malpractice 
compensation.208 Due to their importance in preserving public health, 
Washington courts found the interests in each of these cases compelling. 
Thus, these cases demonstrate that when the State elects to use its police 
power in the medical arena, Washington courts tend to find that the 
State’s actions do not violate article I, section 11. 
D. Using the Least Restrictive Means Requires the State to 
Reasonably Accommodate Free Exercise Rights, Unless Doing So 
Would Unduly Burden Its Compelling Interests 
Under the Washington State Constitution, where a law burdens free 
exercise, it must employ the least restrictive means to achieve the State’s 
interest.209 This is so even if the law furthers public health, peace, or 
safety.210 Although the exact standard in this area is somewhat vague, 
the gist is that if using alternative means more accommodating to free 
exercise rights would not overly hinder the State’s interest, Washington 
courts expect the State to use those alternative means.211 
In the past, when a Washington court has found a compelling state 
interest burdening free exercise rights, it has generally determined that 
the State has employed the least restrictive means to achieve that 
interest.212 One notable exception is Sumner v. First Baptist Church,213 
in which the Washington State Supreme Court determined that the 
record did not sufficiently show the challenged building code and zoning 
ordinance employed the least restrictive means to achieve the 
compelling interest in the safety of children at a private religious 
                                                     
206. State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 863–64, 239 P.2d 545, 548 (1952). 
207. State v. Norman, 61 Wash. App. 16, 23, 117 P.2d 1159, 1163 (1991). 
208. Backlund, 106 Wash. 2d at 644–45, 724 P.2d at 988–89. 
209. Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 200, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (1997) (citing First Covenant 
Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 226−27, 840 P. 2d 174, 187 (1992)). 
210. Id.  
211. See State v. Motherwell, 114 Wash. 2d 353, 365, 788 P.2d 1066, 1072 (1990); Sumner v. 
First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 10, 639 P.2d at 1364. 
212. See, e.g., Motherwell, 114 Wash. 2d at 366, 788 P.2d at 1073; Backlund, 106 Wash. 2d .632, 
646, 724 P.2d 981, 989 (1986); State v. Balzer, 91 Wash. App. 44, 64–65, 954 P.2d 931, 941 
(1998); State v. Clifford, 57 Wash. App. 127, 133–34, 787 P.2d at 571, 575 (1990); cf. State v. 
Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 741, 612 P.2d 795, 799 (1980). 
213. 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982). 
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school.214 Adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s language in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder,215 the Court stated that a trial court must “searchingly examine” 
the government’s asserted interest and consider the effect of specific 
exemptions or deviations.216 The Court further noted that 
“accommodation between the competing interests must be the goal,” and 
“[o]nly if such accommodation is not possible should one legitimate 
interest override another.”217 
The court in Sumner was not entirely forthcoming on exactly when 
“accommodation is not possible.”218 In a later case, however, the Court 
provided some clarifying language. In State v. Motherwell,219 the Court 
declared that the State need not accommodate private religious interests 
where those interests “unduly interfere with the fulfillment of the 
governmental interest.”220 This statement suggests that, in the Court’s 
view, accommodation is not possible where such accommodation would 
unduly burden the State’s interest. Taken together, these cases present a 
somewhat clearer threshold standard for when the State has employed 
the least restrictive means. 
As this section has shown, the government faces a fairly difficult task 
in Washington free exercise cases, at least when compared to the 
complainant. But if the State can persuade the court that its law 
promotes an interest related to public health, peace or safety—such as 
medical care—and that further accommodation would unduly burden its 
interests, it will likely prevail over the party challenging the law. 
V. WASHINGTON COURTS WOULD LIKELY NOT HOLD THE 
RECENTLY ADOPTED PHARMACY RULES INVALID 
UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 
Washington courts have interpreted article I, section 11 to give 
substantial deference to individual free exercise rights.221 The question 
remains whether this degree of deference requires a state court to declare 
the recently-adopted pharmacy rules unconstitutional. As noted in 
Stormans, at least some Washington pharmacists and pharmacy owners 
                                                     
214. Id. at 9–10, 639 P.2d at 1363–64. 
215. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
216. Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d at 10, 639 P.2d at 1363. 
217. Id., 639 P.2d at 1364. 
218. Id. 
219. 114 Wash. 2d 353, 788 P.2d 1066 (1990). 
220. Id. at 365, 788 P.2d at 1072 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982)). 
221. See supra Part III. 
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have a persuasive argument that the rules burden free exercise rights.222 
Do the regulations withstand strict scrutiny as required by First 
Covenant and its progeny? This Comment argues that a court applying 
Washington State Supreme Court precedent would likely uphold the 
rules. As this Part explains, the regulations facilitate medical treatment 
and therefore fall within the State’s police power to promote public 
health, peace, and safety. Moreover, the State cannot further 
accommodate free exercise of religion without seriously undermining its 
interest in assuring patients receive lawful medications in a timely 
manner. 
A. The New Pharmacy Regulations Have a “Coercive” Effect on 
Pharmacists’ Free Exercise Rights 
To successfully assert an article I, section 11 claim, a complainant 
must first demonstrate that the challenged law has a coercive effect on 
free exercise.223 The challenging party must show both a sincerely held 
religious belief and that the government action burdens free exercise 
rights.224 Pharmacies or pharmacists similarly situated to the Stormans 
plaintiffs satisfy both conditions. 
The Ninth Circuit did not question the sincerity of the plaintiffs’ 
religious beliefs; it accepted that the objections were based on religion in 
concluding that the plaintiffs had standing to assert free exercise 
rights.225 In their complaint, the pharmacy and pharmacists expressly 
stated that their refusal to distribute Plan B was guided by religious 
beliefs.226 The pharmacy was so firm in its convictions that it was 
willing to face sanctions from the Board.227 In addition, one plaintiff-
pharmacist left her employment and the other expected to be fired at the 
time the complaint was submitted.228 Although the plaintiffs could have 
been motivated by moral beliefs apart from religion, Washington courts 
have chosen to interpret the scope of religious beliefs broadly and 
typically give the challenging party the benefit of the doubt.229 
                                                     
222. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1120–22 (9th Cir. 2009). 
223. See First United Methodist Church v. Hearings Exam’r for the Seattle Landmarks Pres.  Bd., 
129 Wash. 2d 238, 246, 916 P.2d 347, 378 (1996). 
224. Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 199–200, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (1997). 
225. See Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1120–21. 
226. Complaint, supra note 21, at 8–12.  
227. Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1117. 
228. Id. at 9–12. 
229. See In re Marriage of Jensen-Branch, 78 Wash. App. 482, 490 n.2, 899 P.2d 803, 808 n.2 
(1995) (noting that “religious beliefs” should be interpreted broadly). 
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Similarly, a Washington court would likely find that the regulations 
burden the Stormans plaintiffs’ free exercise rights under article I, 
section 11. In Stormans, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the 
significance of the plaintiffs’ injuries in its standing analysis.230 A 
pharmacy that refuses to dispense medications for religious reasons 
faces sanctions, such as fines or even the loss of its state-issued 
license.231 Because not all pharmacies can afford to accommodate 
pharmacists with religious objections, the rules similarly hinder 
individual pharmacists’ ability to refuse distribution for religious 
reasons. As stated above, one of the plaintiff-pharmacists had already 
lost her job, and both faced termination in the future.232 The plaintiffs’ 
existing and potential injuries appear significant enough to exceed the 
“slight inconvenience” threshold of Northshore.233 Thus, a court 
applying Washington’s free exercise case law would likely hold that the 
rules have a coercive effect on religious beliefs. 
B. Washington Has a Compelling Interest in Ensuring that 
Pharmacies Distribute Lawful Medications, Including Plan B, in a 
Timely Manner 
Because the pharmacy regulations potentially burden free exercise of 
religion, under First Covenant a Washington court must determine that 
the regulations satisfy strict scrutiny to comport with article I, 
section 11.234 Strict scrutiny first requires the State to show a compelling 
interest in the rules.235 Washington’s interests in the regulations are 
sufficiently compelling. Contrary to the District Court’s findings in 
Stormans, the pharmacy regulations are an exercise of the State’s long-
recognized police authority to regulate public health because they relate 
directly to promoting medical treatment. This objective has been 
                                                     
230. Stormans, 586 F.3d 1109, 1120–22 (describing the injuries of the pharmacy and pharmacists 
as “concrete and particularized,” “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,” and “fairly 
traceable” to the new rules (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000)). 
231. See id. at 1120–21; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 18.64.165 (1995); Complaint, supra note 
21, 8–9. 
232. See Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1121–22; Complaint, supra note 21, at 9–12. 
233. Compare the burden of the loss of one’s business and livelihood with a city’s refusal to 
consider a conditional land use permit, which was held to burden free exercise in City of 
Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ. 166 Wash. 2d 633, 644–45, 211 P.2d 406, 411 
(2009). 
234. See supra Part III.B. 
235. See id. 
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recognized as a compelling state interest in prior free exercise cases both 
inside and outside of Washington. 
1. The State’s Interest in Ensuring Access to Lawful Medications 
Relates Directly to Public Health and Is, Therefore, Compelling 
The Western District of Washington and the Ninth Circuit both 
discussed and ultimately disagreed on the precise nature of the State’s 
interest in promulgating the pharmacy regulations. The dispute centered 
on whether the State’s interest was limited to ensuring access to the drug 
Plan B or to prescription drugs more generally.236 The Board of 
Pharmacy initiated the rulemaking process largely due to concerns over 
the drug Plan B,237 a point recognized by both the district court238 and 
the Ninth Circuit.239 But as the process evolved, the Board, working with 
the Governor’s office,240 broadened its interest to prescription drugs 
generally.241 The scope of the final rules is thus not limited to Plan B or 
emergency contraceptives, but to all prescription drugs.242 In a post-
adoption letter interpreting the new regulations, the Board emphasized 
that the regulations responded to a need to “define standards of patient 
care and professional conduct when a pharmacist’s personal objections 
conflicted with the patient’s access to legally prescribed medications.”243 
One of the principal interests expressly relied upon by the Board in 
Stormans was “promoting health by ensuring access to Plan B (and 
other medications) in a timely manner.”244 The Ninth Circuit in turn 
framed the State’s interest in more broad terms: “ensuring that all 
citizens have timely access to lawfully prescribed medications.”245 
                                                     
236. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1260 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
237. Brief for Appellants, supra note 11, at 9–10. 
238. Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1260. 
239. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2009). 
240. Governor Gregoire was actively involved with the rule-making process, openly stating her 
firm opposition to a draft which would have allowed pharmacies to refuse to distribute medications. 
In fact, at a press conference held shortly after a more lenient version of the rules was proposed, the 
Governor acknowledged that she had the authority to remove the entire board with the legislature’s 
consent. Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1251. Judge Leighton emphasized the Governor’s threats in 
concluding that the true “target” of the rules was pharmacists opposing Plan B for religious reasons. 
Id. at 1259. The Ninth Circuit apparently did not agree with Judge Leighton’s assessment. 
241. Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1115 n.4. 
242. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 246-863-095, 246-869-010 (2007). 
243. Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1253. 
244. Id. at 1263 (emphasis added).  
245. Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1139. 
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Ensuring access to lawful medication relates to the State’s interest in 
public health. Prescription medications are prescribed to patients for 
health reasons. Medications available over the counter further similar 
ends.246 As recognized by the Ninth Circuit, improper denial of Plan B, 
or any other lawful drug, presents a legitimate public health concern.247 
Because the rules implicate valid public health concerns, a court 
properly applying Washington free exercise jurisprudence would likely 
hold the State’s interest in the rules sufficiently compelling. 
2. The State’s Interests in the Pharmacy Rules Are Closely Aligned 
with Those Recognized as Compelling in Cases Involving Medical 
Care or Treatment 
In prior free exercise cases, Washington appellate courts found 
medical interests to be sufficiently compelling.248 The interests advanced 
in these prior cases are very similar to those furthered by the pharmacy 
regulations. 
For example, in Holcomb, the plaintiff refused for religious reasons to 
acquiesce to a state university’s requirement that he undergo 
tuberculosis screening.249 Like the rules adopted by the Board of 
Pharmacy, the screening policy at issue in Holcomb was adopted for the 
purpose of protecting the health of the broader community.250 By 
shielding the campus populace from a contagious disease, the screening 
requirement strengthened the community’s overall health. The new 
pharmacy rules serve an analogous function by protecting the general 
population’s access to medications—medications that, among other 
things, combat disease and promote personal health. 
Similarly, in Norman, the Court of Appeals refused to allow a parent 
to use free exercise rights to avoid criminal punishment for his refusal to 
provide medical care for his ailing child.251 By permitting the criminal 
prosecution of the defendant father, the court recognized the compelling 
nature of the State’s interest in ensuring that parents do not block their 
children’s access to needed medical treatment.252 Through the new 
                                                     
246. Plan B is available over the counter for women aged 17 years or older, and may be 
prescribed to women aged younger than 17 years. See Letter from Monroe and Leonard-Segal, 
supra note 14. 
247. Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1139. 
248. See supra Part IV.C. 
249. State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 861, 239 P.2d 545, 546 (1952).  
250. See id. at 863–64, 239 P.2d at 548. 
251. State v. Norman, 61 Wash. App. 16, 18, 808 P.2d 1159, 1160 (1991).  
252. Id. at 23, 117 P.2d at 1163. 
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pharmacy regulations, the State similarly endeavors to prevent certain 
individuals from obstructing general access to medical treatment. 
The issues in Stormans are particularly analogous to those presented 
in Backlund.253 The public hospital regulation challenged in Backlund 
imposed an affirmative requirement on medical professionals to procure 
liability insurance.254 The hospital’s purpose in adopting the new policy 
was to decrease its liability expenses and liability exposure.255 Such a 
decrease would enhance hospital efficiency, thereby increasing the 
hospital’s ability to serve the community’s medical needs.256 In this 
respect, the recently-adopted pharmacy regulations are quite similar to 
the hospital rule in Backlund. The pharmacy rules’ purpose is to serve 
community health needs: they remove certain barriers to access to lawful 
medications by regulating the conduct of a discrete class of medical 
professionals. In so doing, the regulations increase the reliability and 
accessibility of the state’s pharmacy system.257 
Holcomb, Norman, and Backlund all stand as examples of cases 
where Washington courts determined that the government’s interests in 
medical care and treatment were sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs’ free 
exercise claims. Although not identical, the State’s interests in 
promulgating the new pharmacy rules closely parallel those advanced in 
each of these cases. These similarities support the contention that a 
Washington state court would find the rules serve a compelling interest. 
3. The District Court’s Conclusion in Stormans Is Not Consistent with 
Washington’s Free Exercise Cases 
In Stormans, the federal district court for the Western District of 
Washington ordered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the 
new pharmacy rules because it determined that the State’s interests were 
not compelling.258 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s judgment because the regulations were deemed neutral and 
generally applicable, and, therefore, not subject to strict scrutiny.259 
                                                     
253. Backlund v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 106 Wash. 2d 632, 724 P.2d 981 (1986). 
254. Id. at 634–35, 724 P.2d at 983. 
255. Id. at 644–45, 724 P.2d at 988–89. 
256. Id. 
257. The Ninth Circuit bolstered this conclusion when it discussed how many people will benefit 
from the new rules: “Whatever that number, it will not be smaller than the number of pharmacists or 
pharmacies affected by the regulation, so it cannot be shrugged off as insignificant.” Stormans, Inc. 
v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). 
258. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1263–64 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
259. See supra Part II.B. 
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Thus, the Ninth Circuit had no cause to directly counter the district 
court’s compelling interest analysis.260 Nonetheless, the district court’s 
analysis would not be consistent with Washington’s free exercise 
jurisprudence for two major reasons. 
First, the district court overemphasized the historical background of 
the administrative regulations. Rather than relying on the text of the new 
rules, the court looked largely to the history of the rules’ development.261 
The court’s approach is understandable given it was considering whether 
the regulations “infringe upon or restrict” religion in a manner 
inconsistent with the First Amendment.262 But in so doing, the court 
went too far and concluded that the true “focus” of the law was Plan 
B.263 
Washington courts generally have not significantly scrutinized the 
history of a challenged law when examining the State’s interest in free 
exercise cases.264 Rather, Washington courts tend to emphasize the 
broader purposes of the challenged law.265 In State v. Balzer,266 the 
Washington Court of Appeals took some note of the history behind the 
                                                     
260. As explained in this section, however, several portions of the Ninth’s Circuit opinion 
undermine the district court’s compelling interest analysis.  
261. Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1260–61. The Ninth Circuit in its subsequent opinion stated 
that it was unclear whether the district court was permitted to examine the historical background of 
the ordinances, noting that “the law is unsettled regarding the scope of its consideration in the free 
exercise arena.” 586 F.3d at 1131. 
262. Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1258. 
263. Id. at 1260. 
264. See, e.g., First United Methodist Church v. Hearings Exam’r for the Seattle Landmarks Pres. 
Bd., 129 Wash. 2d 238, 250, 916 P.2d 347, 380 (1996) (characterizing the city’s interest in 
landmark preservation ordinance generally as “landmark preservation” with no examination of 
legislative history); First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d. 203, 222–23, 840 P.2d 
174, 185 (1992) (describing a city’s interest in landmark preservation ordinance as “further[ing] 
cultural and esthetic interests” with no discussion of the ordinance’s historical development); State 
v. Motherwell, 114 Wash. 2d 353, 365, 788 P.2d 1066, 1072 (1990) (framing State’s interest in 
child abuse reporting statute broadly as “the protection of children” without examining legislative 
history); State v. Clifford, 57 Wash. App. 127, 132–33, 787 P.2d 571, 574–75 (1990) (recognizing 
without reference to legislative history that the State’s interest in a driver’s license requirement is 
“to make highways as safe as possible” and “protecting the safety of  . . . highway users”); cf. State 
v. Norman, 61 Wash. App. 16, 21–23, 808 P.2d 1159, 1162–63 (1991) (referencing the history of 
common law in rejecting defendant’s arguments that the history supported his failure to provide his 
child medical treatment, but ultimately acknowledging that the common law was superseded by 
statute).  Contra Backlund v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 106 Wash. 2d 632, 644–45, 724 P.2d 981, 988–89 
(1986) (reviewing hospital board’s findings of fact before concluding its interest in requiring 
liability insurance was compelling). 
265. See Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1260. 
266. 91 Wash. App. 44, 954 P.2d 931 (1999).   
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drug statute at issue.267 But in so doing, the court afforded great 
deference to the broader interests advanced by both the state legislature 
and by Congress.268 Even if one assumes that a law’s history is an 
important factor in a compelling interest analysis, the history of the 
pharmacy rules is not as clear as the district court ultimately concluded 
in Stormans. As the Ninth Circuit expressly emphasized: 
While the Board’s deliberative process may have been initiated 
over concerns regarding Plan B, the administrative history 
hardly reveals a single design to burden religious practice; 
rather, it is a patchwork quilt of concerns, ideas, and 
motivations. The record reveals that the draft rules morphed and 
evolved throughout the deliberative process, as did the concerns 
raised both by rulemakers and the public participants. . . . To the 
extent the record indicates anything about the Board’s 
motivation in adopting the final rules, it shows the Board was 
motivated by concerns about the potential deleterious effect on 
public health that would result from allowing pharmacists to 
refuse to dispense lawfully prescribed medications based on 
personal, moral objections (of which religious objections are a 
subset).269 
A Washington state court would likely take a similarly broad and 
somewhat skeptical view of the legislative history, at least in free 
exercise cases. 
Second, the district court mischaracterized the nature of the State’s 
interest. The district court rejected the State’s position that the purpose 
of the pharmacy regulations was to promote the health and welfare of its 
citizenry.270 Rather, in examining the historical record, the court 
concluded “that the interests promoted by the regulations have more to 
do with convenience and heartfelt feelings than with actual access to 
certain medications.”271 The court appears to have undervalued the very 
real potential consequences at issue. A person’s failure to get lawful 
medication promptly could have serious health ramifications. Plan B 
                                                     
267. Id. at 58, 954 P.2d at 938.   
268. Id. at 59, 954 P.2d at 938 (stating that “we take judicial notice of marijuana’s effects and 
harmfulness as evidenced by the legislative assessments expressed in both state and federal case 
law”). 
269. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009). 
270. Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1263. 
271. Id. 
113010_Horton_Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/3/2010  6:08 PM 
2010] “PLAN B” AND RELIGIOUS PHARMACISTS 773 
 
itself has a very limited window of effectiveness.272 Thus, the benefits of 
Plan B could be completely negated by a pharmacist refusing 
distribution for religious reasons, particularly in smaller communities 
where other pharmacies are less accessible.273 The health implications 
could be even more dire with other medications.274 
The district court discarded this point, noting that the same result 
could occur for reasons “wholly acceptable under the regulations,” such 
as “lack of money, the drug is not in stock, no one has previously 
requested it, or the store is closed on Sunday.”275 But unlike a religious 
refusal, these “wholly acceptable” reasons for refusal276 are reasonable 
restrictions essential to the continued operation of a pharmacy as an 
effective business.277 As noted by the Ninth Circuit, “the absence of 
these exemptions would likely drive pharmacies out of business 
or . . . mandate unsafe practices. Therefore, the exemptions actually 
increase access to medications by making it possible for pharmacies to 
comply with the rules, further patient safety, and maintain their 
business.”278 These reasonable exceptions simply do not detract from the 
compelling nature of the State’s interest.279 
The pharmacy regulations are to some degree about the convenience 
of those entitled to lawful medications, just as the hospital regulation 
challenged in Backlund was convenient for the hospital administration. 
But the key question in Washington free exercise analysis is whether the 
State’s interests serve public health, peace, or safety, or are otherwise 
compelling.280 The Board’s pharmacy rules serve broader public health 
                                                     
272. Plan B is most effective within the first 12 to 24 hours after sexual intercourse and becomes 
less effective with each subsequent hour. It should be taken no more than 72 hours after intercourse 
and has no effect beyond 120 hours. Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1114. 
273. See id. at 1139 (noting that “unreasonable delay . . . may render the drug [Plan B] ineffective 
in preventing an unwanted pregnancy”). 
274. For instance, the treatment for HIV recommended by the U.S. Department of Human 
Services is the highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART), which involves a regimen of three 
different types of medication. Some of these medications must be taken several times a day at 
specific times. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Starting Anti-HIV Medications 
(Dec. 2009), available at http://aidsinfo.nih.gov/ContentFiles/StartingAnti-HIVMeds_FS_en.pdf. 
275. Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.  
276. The reasons are expressly laid out in the regulation. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 246-863-
095(4)(a)–(e), 246-869-010(4)(a)–(e) (2007).  
277. Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1135. 
278. Id. (emphasis added). 
279. One might argue that these exemptions demonstrate that the rules do not employ the least 
restrictive means to achieve the State’s interest. But as will be discussed later, this argument 
ultimately fails. See infra Part V.C. 
280. See supra Part IV.B. 
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ends.281 Thus, the district court’s basis for concluding that the rules do 
not advance a compelling state interest would likely be rejected by a 
Washington court interpreting article I, section 11. 
4. A Finding of a Compelling Interest Would Be Consistent with 
Similar Opinions in Other Jurisdictions 
Some states, such as Washington, have expressly interpreted their 
state constitutions to provide greater protection than the First 
Amendment with regard to free exercise rights. For example, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Montana, and Oregon have all departed from the First 
Amendment’s Smith standard and adopted a strict scrutiny approach in 
free exercise cases.282 A survey of the case law in these jurisdictions, 
however, reveals few free exercise cases where the State’s interest 
relates to public health.283 These cases considered issues very different 
from those presented in Stormans. Apart from the courts’ general 
recognition of the government’s compelling interest in public health, 
these cases do little to explain how a Washington court would rule in 
applying strict scrutiny to a pharmacy regulation. 
Although the California State Supreme Court has not expressly held 
its state constitution to be more protective of free exercise rights than the 
First Amendment, it has acknowledged that its constitution may be more 
protective.284 And, as discussed earlier in this Comment,285 the 
California State Supreme Court has decided two cases examining public 
                                                     
281. See supra Part V.B.2.  
282. See Tracey Levy, Rediscovering Rights: State Courts Reconsider the Free Exercise Clauses 
of Their Own Constitutions in the Wake of Employment Division v. Smith, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1017, 
1019 (1994). 
283. See, e.g., Am. Lithuanian Naturalization Club v. Bd. of Health, 844 N.E.2d 231, 242–43 
(Mass. 2006) (upholding town no-smoking ordinance because plaintiffs demonstrated no burden on 
free exercise rights); Norwood Hospital v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017, 1022–25 (Mass. 1991) (state’s 
interest in protecting life, preventing suicide, ensuring integrity in the medical profession, and 
protecting dependent children outweighed by adult patient’s right to refuse medical treatment); In re 
McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411, 413–14 (Mass. 1991) (upholding lower court’s order to give child a 
blood transfusion despite parents’ religious objections given the serious health implications for the 
child); Sagar v. Sagar, 781 N.E.2d 54, 59 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (recognizing that interest in 
protecting child’s health and safety may justify court enforcement of one parent’s religious 
preferences to the detriment of the other parent’s free exercise rights); State v. Soto, 537 P.2d 142, 
143–44 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (defendant’s conviction for possession of mescaline affirmed despite 
free exercise challenge on the grounds that the state had a compelling interest in the preservation of 
health and safety).  
284. See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 959, 968 (Cal. 
2008); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 91–92 (Cal. 2004). 
285. See supra Part II.C. 
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health issues similar to those presented in Stormans. In both cases the 
Court not only recognized the potentially greater protection provided by 
its state constitution, but also adopted a strict scrutiny analysis similar to 
that utilized by Washington courts interpreting article I, section 11.286 
In Catholic Charities of Sacramento,287 considering a statute requiring 
employers to provide insurance coverage for prescription contraceptives, 
the California State Supreme Court recognized the State’s compelling 
interest in eliminating a form of gender discrimination in the provision 
of health care benefits.288 The Court emphasized the additional health 
costs women would incur without the coverage.289 Similarly in North 
Coast, the California State Supreme Court recognized the State’s 
compelling interest in ensuring “full and equal access to medical 
treatment” when it held that the state Civil Rights Act could prohibit 
private medical practitioners from refusing to treat patients on the basis 
of sexual orientation.290 These recognized interests are closely analogous 
to the primary goal advanced by the State in Stormans—ensuring equal 
access to medications. 
In scrutinizing two different health-related statutes,291 the California 
State Supreme Court concluded that the public health interests advanced 
by the State were compelling. In so concluding, the Court employed a 
strict scrutiny approach very similar to Washington’s.292 And although 
states with free exercise jurisprudence similar to Washington’s have not 
examined an analogous issue to that presented in Stormans, these states 
have recognized that public health interests justify burdening free 
exercise rights, at least under certain conditions.293 These cases further 
support a finding that the pharmacy rules serve a compelling state 
interest. 
                                                     
286. See North Coast, 189 P.3d at 968; Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 85 P.3d at 91–92. 
287. 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004). 
288. Id. at 92–94.  
289. Id. at 92–93. 
290. North Coast, 189 P.3d at 968.  
291. California’s Civil Rights Act is, of course, not limited to health services. CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 51(b) (2005); see also id. at 965. But given its treatment by the California State Supreme Court in 
North Coast, the Act can fairly be characterized as a health services law for the purpose of 
analyzing similar cases involving constitutional protections of religious free exercise. 
292. See id.; Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 85 P.3d at 91–92. 
293. See supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Board’s Regulatory Scheme Imposes the Least Restrictive 
Means Available to Ensure Pharmacies Distribute Medications 
Demonstrating a compelling interest is only half of the State’s 
requirement under Munns and First Covenant. The challenged law must 
also employ the “least restrictive possible means” to achieve the 
interest.294 Washington jurisprudence requires a fact-specific approach 
when determining if a particular regulation employs the least restrictive 
means to achieve a compelling interest. A court must balance the 
competing interests and “[o]nly if . . . accommodation is not possible 
should one legitimate interest override another.”295 Washington 
pharmacists have undeniably strong personal interests, but in this 
instance, the State went to great lengths to accommodate those 
interests.296 Consequently, a Washington court would likely find that the 
rules invoke the least restrictive means available. 
As the Ninth Circuit recognized, the Board took sixteen months 
developing the rules.297 The Board drafted several proposed regulations, 
attempting to balance the public need for lawful medication with the 
rights of individual pharmacists.298 In its brief, the Stormans plaintiffs 
advanced certain alternatives to the pharmacy regulations recommended 
by the American Pharmacists Association (APhA).299 These alternatives 
included: proactively directing prescribers and patients to pharmacies 
that sell the drug, setting up a telephone hotline and website informing 
patients of pharmacies that sell the drug, notifying patients and the 
Board in advance that a pharmacy does not sell the drug, and 
encouraging health-care providers to maintain inventories of drugs not 
stocked by local pharmacies.300 Although the APhA’s alternatives seem 
reasonable on their surface, they are deficient in numerous respects. 
For these alternatives to be effective, the patient must overcome 
certain barriers to actually receiving the information about the drug’s 
availability. Plan B is available over the counter to certain patients,301 so 
not every patient will have consulted a health-care provider before 
                                                     
294. Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 200, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (1997). 
295. Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 10, 639 P.2d 1358, 1364 (1982). 
296. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1113–16 (9th Cir. 2009). 
297. Id. at 1114. 
298. See id. at 1116. 
299. Brief for the Appellee-Plaintiffs at 53–54, Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 
2009) (No. 07-36039, 07-36040). 
300. Id. 
301. Letter from Monroe and Leonard-Segal, supra note 14. 
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attempting to acquire it. The hotline or website would be essentially 
useless if the patient lacked reliable access to a telephone or computer or 
if the patient did not know the hotline telephone number or web address. 
Moreover, even a patient with access to the hotline or website may not 
have available transportation to get to another nearby pharmacy. Nor can 
the hotline or website prevent a recommended pharmacy or pharmacist 
from having a change of heart and refusing to distribute the drug. These 
alternatives present the very real possibility that some patients, if not 
denied access altogether, will encounter significant delays in receiving 
medication—delays that are at best inconvenient, but are substantially 
more problematic where the drug is time sensitive like Plan B.302 Simply 
put, the practical effect of the APhA’s proposed system is that some 
patients will almost certainly be denied timely distribution of lawful 
medication,303 thus unduly burdening the State’s ultimate interest in 
promulgating the current pharmacy rules. 
One might argue—as did the district court in Stormans—that if the 
State is truly serious about ensuring access to medications, it should 
reform the rules to eliminate many of the existing exemptions.304 But as 
the Ninth Circuit noted, these exceptions, unlike religious-based refusal, 
are reasonable restrictions that are essential to a pharmacy’s economic 
viability.305 Abandoning these reasonable barriers is simply not feasible 
and would again unduly burden the State’s ultimate interest. 
Further, the rules as they stand accommodate free exercise rights to a 
certain degree. The pharmacy must assure that legal drugs are timely 
distributed, but individual pharmacists may individually refuse to 
dispense drugs based on religious objections.306 A pharmacy can 
accommodate an objecting pharmacist in any way it sees fit, such as by 
having another pharmacist available in person or by telephone.307 The 
rules ensure patients get their medications while simultaneously 
respecting personal religious beliefs. This approach is far more 
deferential to personal free exercise rights than the hospital regulation 
                                                     
302. See supra Part V.B.3. 
303. See Kelsey C. Brodsho, Recent Developments: Patient Expectations and Access to 
Prescription Medications Are Threatened by Pharmacist Conscience Clauses, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
TECH. 327, 334–35 (2005). 
304. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1263 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
305. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). 
306. See id. at 1116. 
307. See id. 
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considered in Backlund,308 which imposed upon the challenging 
physician an absolute requirement to procure liability insurance.309 
The current pharmacy rules achieve the very degree of balancing and 
accommodation that Washington courts have required in free exercise 
cases. The Board’s rules do not go beyond the limits that are necessary 
to further its compelling interest in public health. Thus, the rules 
represent the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling interest as 
those terms are understood in light of cases interpreting article I, 
section 11. 
D. Given the Nature of the Profession, Pharmacists Should 
Understand that Professional Obligations Might Conflict with 
Their Personal Religious Convictions 
Although pharmacists have constitutional rights, they also choose to 
be members of a profession dedicated to providing health services to the 
public, and, therefore, should be prepared to encounter regulations that 
place public needs at odds with personal religious beliefs.310 One should 
not join the armed forces if one’s religious beliefs forbid the exercise of 
violence.311 By the same token, one should not choose pharmacy as a 
profession if one feels compelled to withhold certain medications for 
religious reasons. Pharmacists’ core function is to facilitate, and not 
hinder, access to medication. Society expects them to fulfill this role.312 
The Code of Ethics for Pharmacists adopted by the APhA states that a 
pharmacist “respects the autonomy and dignity of each patient” and 
“serves individual, community, and societal needs.”313 Pharmacists take 
a professional oath to “apply [their] knowledge, experience, and 
                                                     
308. Backlund v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 106 Wash. 2d 632, 724 P.2d 981 (1986). 
309. Id. at 634, 724 P.2d at 983.  
310. See Vokes, supra note 8, at 411–12 (a pharmacist’s professional obligations dictate that 
“when the pharmacist’s beliefs are in direct conflict with the patient’s decision, a pharmacist ought 
to fill the prescription against his or her own beliefs out of respect for the patient’s beliefs”). 
311. This is not to say that no U.S. military service members ever raise religious or otherwise 
moral objections that preclude them from serving in combat. Such “conscientious objectors,” 
however, face almost certain discharge from military service. See Joseph B. Mackey, Reclaiming 
the In-Service Conscientious Objector Program: Proposals for Creating a Meaningful Limitation to 
the Claim of Conscientious Objection, 2008 ARMY LAW. 31, 35 (2007); see also DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 1300.06 §§ 4.1–4.2 (2007). 
312. See Brodsho, supra note 303, at 328–29; Vokes, supra note 8, at 406–07, 411–12. 
313. Code of Ethics for Pharmacists, AMERICAN PHARMACISTS ASSOCIATION (APHA), 
http://www.pharmacist.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search1&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cf
m&ContentID=2903 (last visited Oct. 3, 2010). Although this code of ethics is not binding, it 
outlines “the principles that form the fundamental basis of the roles and responsibilities of 
pharmacists.” Id. 
113010_Horton_Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/3/2010  6:08 PM 
2010] “PLAN B” AND RELIGIOUS PHARMACISTS 779 
 
skills . . . to assure optimal outcomes for . . . patients” and to “embrace 
and advocate changes that improve patient care.”314 Given these 
professional realities, pharmacists should expect that the State would 
permit them to refuse to dispense medications to which a patient is 
entitled. 
Although not expressly adopting it as a required consideration in 
cases interpreting article I, section 11, the Washington State Supreme 
Court on at least one occasion examined the characteristics of the 
challenger’s profession in assessing the validity of a free exercise 
argument. In Backland, upholding a policy requiring a physician to 
procure liability insurance, the Court noted: 
[Appellant] freely chose to enter into the profession of medicine. 
Those who enter into a profession as a matter of choice 
necessarily face regulation as to their own conduct and their 
voluntarily imposed personal limitations cannot override the 
regulatory schemes which bind others in that activity. 
[Appellant’s] practice is open to the public. He enjoys the 
economic benefits of his practice. . . . The Board’s decision not 
to grant an exemption [to the insurance requirement] is 
supported by the findings and does not impinge upon Dr. 
Backlund’s right to believe as he chooses, only upon his practice 
of those beliefs when such practice can be to the detriment of 
others.315 
Each of these facts highlighted by the Court in Backlund is equally 
applicable to Washington pharmacists. They are voluntary members of a 
heavily regulated profession316 providing health services to the general 
public. Pharmacists receive economic benefits from their arrangement 
with the State.317 And the pharmacy rules do not regulate religious 
beliefs but rather conduct that negatively impacts third parties.318 
                                                     
314. Oath of a Pharmacist, AMERICAN PHARMACISTS ASSOCIATION (APHA), http:// 
www.pharmacist.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Oath_of_a_Pharmacist&Template=/CM/HTML
Display.cfm&ContentID=18306 (last visited Oct. 3, 2010). 
315. Backlund v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 106 Wash. 2d 632, 638, 724 P.2d 981, 990 (1986). 
316. For a detailed summary of the Washington regulations applicable to the pharmacy industry, 
see generally WASH. STATE BD. OF PHARMACY, PHARMACY LAWS AND RULES (Apr. 2010), 
available at http://www.doh.wa.gov/hsqa/professions/pharmacy/documents/2010LawBook.pdf. 
317. A report published by IMS Health, a market intelligence provider for the pharmaceutical and 
health industries, has placed the total sale of prescription drugs in the U.S. to $300.3 billion in 2009. 
Gary Gatyas, IMS Health Reports U.S. Prescription Sales Grew 5.1 Percent in 2009, to $300.3 
Billion, IMS HEALTH (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/imshealth/menuitem. 
a46c6d4df3db4b3d88f611019418c22a/?vgnextoid=d690a27e9d5b7210VgnVCM100000ed152ca2R
CRD&cpsextcurrchannel=1. 
318. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1131 (9th Cir. 2009) (acknowledging that the 
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Pharmacists are professionals licensed by the State to provide a 
critical public health service, specifically distributing medications. The 
underlying nature and realities of the profession undermine the 
expectation that free exercise rights allow pharmacists to withhold 
lawful medications from patients who need them. A Washington state 
court, particularly in light of the closing comments in Backlund, would 
likely consider these facts in assessing the scope of a pharmacist’s free 
exercise rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Washington’s recently adopted pharmacy regulations 
withstood a First Amendment attack, the Stormans plaintiffs or other 
similarly situated pharmacists may seek shelter under the Washington 
State Constitution’s article I, section 11. But considering the current 
state of Washington’s free exercise law, it is unlikely that this provision 
would provide any reprieve for religious pharmacists or their supporters. 
The Washington State Constitution does protect free exercise rights to a 
greater extent than the First Amendment, and one can never predict with 
absolute certainty how any given court will decide an issue. 
Nevertheless, the rules’ public health impact and degree of religious 
accommodation strongly suggest that they would survive scrutiny under 
article I, section 11. 
 
                                                     
regulations “do not suppress, target, or single out the practice of any religion because of religious 
content”). 
